What should be the appropriate macroeconomic policy to minimize the volatility of output in a resource-based economy, i.e. in an economy that is highly dependent on export of resources with very volatile world prices? This paper examines the sources of volatility of output in Russia as compared to other countries and concludes that in 1994-2004 volatility of Russian growth rates was mostly associated with internal monetary shocks, rather than with external terms of trade shocks.
was mostly associated with internal monetary shocks, rather than with external terms of trade shocks.
In all countries that export resources with highly volatile prices, like Russia, volatility of economic growth is associated with volatility of RER, which in turn is mostly caused by the inability to accumulate enough foreign exchange reserves (FOREX) in central bank accounts and in stabilization funds (SF). However, in Russia, volatility of RER and GDP growth rates in recent 10 years was associated not so much with objective circumstances (terms of trade -TTshocks), but with poor macroeconomic policies -despite intuition, volatility of real exchange rate (RER) was caused mostly by internal monetary shocks rather than by external terms of trade shocks.
It is argued that the good (minimizing volatility) macroeconomic policy for Russia would be (1) not to generate monetary shocks (2) to cope with inevitable external shocks via changes in FOREX and SF, while keeping the RER stable.
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EXCHANGE RATE IN A RESOURCE-BASED ECONOMY IN THE SHORT-TERM:
THE CASE OF RUSSIA Vladimir Popov
The problem: options for managing external shocks
Usually the issue of the exchange rate in a resource based economy is discussed in the framework of the Dutch disease model -the overvaluation of the exchange rate that undermines non-resource exports and has negative implications for economic growth. Russia definitely developed a Dutch disease prior to the currency crises of 1998 (Montes, Popov, 1999; Popov, 2003a,b) and developed it again recently (the real exchange rate in 2005 exceeded the pre-crisis level of 1998). This paper, however, deals with a different issue -the short term adjustment of the resource based economy to changes in terms of trade. The long run equilibrium level of the real exchange rate and the policy to influence it via foreign exchange reserves accumulation (disequilibrium exchange rate) is a separate issue that is considered elsewhere (Polterovich, Popov, 2004) .
Back of the envelope calculations. Russia exported in 2005 about 150 million tons of oil and 150
billion cubic meters of gas worth about $100 billion (all numbers are rounded for simplicity).
The price of oil and gas varied greatly -only in recent decade oil prices went from $10 to over $60 a barrel ($70 to $400 a ton), and gas price changed accordingly -they are strongly correlated with oil prices. Imagine a pretty bad (for Russia), but not totally unrealistic scenariooil prices would drop to $10 a barrel and would stay at this level for 5 years. Annual Russian revenues from exports of hydrocarbons would fall to about $20 billion instead of $100 billion, so that in 5 years there would accumulate a $400 billion shortfall (Russian GDP at official exchange rate in 2005 totaled about $600 billion). How could Russia adjust to such a negative trade shock (deterioration in terms of trade)?
There are basically three options for the country dependent on export/import of commodities with highly volatile prices to cope with terms of trade (TT) shocks: (1) to adjust by importing/exporting capital, (2) to carry out adjustment via changes in foreign exchange reserves (FOREX) and/or Stabilization Fund (SF) with appropriate sterilization and without changing real exchange rate (RER), (3) to adjust via changes in RER (allowing either an adjustment of nominal exchange rate or a change in money supply altering the rate of inflation). The first two mechanisms (assuming other good macroeconomic policies) are not associated with the adjustment in real trade flows and hence do not entail adjustments in the real sector of the economy because the RER remains stable. The third mechanism implies that the volumes of export and import change in response to changes in RER, hence the real sector of the economy also responds (output changes).
Option #1: Borrowing abroad to dampen the negative trade shock. Private international capital flows are volatile and do not mitigate fully fluctuation in terms of trade. They seem to be procyclical, rather than countercyclical -when terms of trade deteriorate, capital flees the country instead of coming in. The empirical evidence suggests that this is true for most countries and in particular -for Russia. So, in fact, private capital flows add insult to injury and reinforce the terms of trade shocks. Official capital flows are counter-cyclical with respect to terms of trade shocks -international financial institutions, such as IMF and World Bank, and national governments provide additional credits to countries affected by negative trade shocks, but the amounts are too small, if not to say negligible, to fully counter the negative impact of deterioration of the balance of payments caused by the fall in export prices and the outflow of private capital. Suffice it to recall the role of international financial institutions in recent currency crises in the world -in East Asian countries in 1997 , in Russia in 1998 , in Brazil in 1999 , in Argentina in 2002 in all these cases the official capital flows were by far not enough to counter the effects of private capital flight. So long as the international financial architecture remains as it is, countries are basically left to themselves to manage shocks that affect their current and capital accounts. In the Russian case it is unreasonable to expect that a country would be able to borrow in just several years funds abroad comparable to the size of its GDP.
Option #2. Running down foreign exchange reserves and stabilization fund. Foreign exchange reserves and stabilization funds, if they are large enough, provide a reliable cushion to dampen the impact of negative trade and capital flows shocks. However today among major resource exporters only Norway (oil exporter) and Botswana (diamond exporter) may have enough money in FOREX and SF (more then their annual GDPs) to counter fully the impact of volatile prices for resources and capital movements. By the end of 2005, Russia had about $180 billion in FOREX, including $30 billion in SF -this is definitely a tangible amount (1/3 of GDP), but at least twice as much is needed to survive the "rainy day". One of the central arguments of this paper is that under the current circumstances Russia needs a larger Stabilization Fund.
Option #3: Real devaluation. Putting aside part of the GDP into FOREX and SF is costly, even more so that this money should be invested in short-term low risk and hence low yield securities abroad. This is exactly the reason, why current Russian policy of building up FOREX and SF faces heavy criticism at home and abroad: why not use this money for the improvement of health care and education, for helping the poor and for investment into ailing infrastructure (the list could be continued, of course), say the critics. The counter-argument, however, is no less powerful: if there is no cushion in the form of FOREX and SF, the only way to cope with the negative trade shock and the associated outflow of capital is to devalue the real exchange rate.
When oil prices fall and capital flees, the deteriorating balance of payments could be remedied only by nominal exchange rate devaluation (in case of floating exchange rate) or (in case of fixed rate) by the slow down of growth of money supply (due to reduction of FOREX that is not sterilized; if it is sterilized, the balance of payments will not get back to the equilibrium, so FOREX would eventually be depleted). In both cases the result is the real devaluation of the national currency, i.e. the decrease of the ratio of domestic prices (expressed in foreign currency) to foreign prices. Such a real devaluation is a bad policy because it inevitably causes adjustments in the real sector and these adjustments are by definition temporary.
Suppose oil prices fall and the ruble is devalued to keep the balance of payments in the equilibrium. For oil producers the positive impact of devaluation neutralizes the negative impact of falling oil prices, but for other producers of tradable goods (machinery, for instance) real devaluation means higher prices and profits, so there is a reallocation of resources (capital and labor) from oil to machinery sector. The problem is that this reallocation is temporary because after some time oil prices will rise and resources should flow in the opposite direction. Inasmuch as oil and gas prices fluctuate around the trend, it does not make sense to change the structure of the economy in response to their fluctuations -this is just too costly. To word it differently, real exchange rate should be as stable as possible; if it fluctuates a lot, this is a definite sign of bad policy that misleads economic agents.
Literature review. The adjustment to external shocks in resource oriented economies were studied extensively in the past. Balassa (1984) decomposed the policy responses to external shocks into four components (foreign borrowing, export expansion, import compression, and slower GDP growth). Auty (1994) argued that East Asian countries (Korea, Taiwan) responded to shocks mainly by export growth and import cuts, so did not experience the growth collapse after these shocks like Latin American countries (Argentina, Mexico) that responded to shocks mainly by increasing their external debt. Implicitly this is an argument in favor of real devaluation that helps to restore growth by promoting export and curbing import. But such a policy comes at a price -real devaluation causes reallocation of capital and labor and thus is associated with adjustment costs. Sosunov and Zamulin (2005) developed and calibrated the model of a resource exporting economy experiencing external terms of trade shocks to study the volatility of output and inflation: the result was that the monetary policy rule of responding to inflation and RER fluctuations allows to limit the output-inflation volatility better than the other monetary policy rules. Vdovichenko and Voronina (2004) showed that in 1999-2003 the central bank of Russia (CBR) actually did not follow meticulously the proclaimed targets of fighting inflation. In regulating money supply it also took into account changes in output (the deviation of actual output from trend) and changes in real exchange rate. The authors estimated separate equations for interventions (change in foreign exchange reserves) and sterilization (change in net domestic credit). It turned out that the accumulation of reserves accelerated when the RER appreciated, but it was not influenced by changes in output and prices. On the contrary, sterilization operations were influenced by the behavior of output and prices. Because the appreciation of the RER has a suppressing effect on output and prices, it means that by trying to limit the real appreciation of the ruble via reserve accumulation the CBR was de facto trying to support output at the expense of inflation.
There are a number of studies of exchange rate misalignment and volatility in various countries (), as well as studies that use decomposition technique from the paper by Blanchard and Quah (1989) that analyzed the fluctuations of real GDP (supply and demand shocks, demand shocks were treated as temporary, i.e. assumed to have no effect on real GDP in the long run). These studies, however, are based on a certain assumptions about the nature of the impact of supply and demand shocks and about the equilibrium long term real exchange rate that are often difficult to justify. In particular, the assumption that nominal shocks (nominal money supply) does not affect the real exchange rate in the long run, i.e. may have only transitionary impact on real exchange (this assumption is needed to close the BVAR model) does not appear to be very reasonable. It may be appropriate for more mature market economies, but not for transition economies especially for a relatively short (several years) period of time. In transition economies, especially in resource rich countries, prices for quite a number of goods are controlled by the government -these prices do not change in response to changes in money supply; hence the ratio prices of tradables to nontradables (with controlled prices) and thus real exchange rate may react even in the long run to changes in money supply. This paper makes no special ex ante assumptions on the nature of shocks and the long term equilibrium real exchange rate. It is an empirical study of factors that influence output volatility -how terms of trade shocks and internal monetary shocks are mitigated/reinforced by the specific macroeconomic policies, i.e. monetary and exchange rate policy, including sterilization of changes in money supply. In the next section 2, the evidence from cross-country regressions, explaining volatility of output, is presented. Section 3 compares this evidence with the stylized facts derived from regressions on Russian time series: it turns out that in both cases volatility of GDP growth rates is linked to the volatility of RER, but in Russia, unlike in other countries, sterilization policy of the central bank increases the volatility of output. In section 4 a possible explanation for the identified puzzle is suggested: as improbable as it sounds, it seems like the volatility of Russian GDP growth rates resulted in 1994-2004 mainly from internal monetary shocks, not from the terms of trade shocks. Finally section 5 concludes and discusses policy implications.
Adjustment to external shocks: evidence from cross-country regressions
Would a particular country be willing to reduce volatility at the expense of lowering the long term growth rate, if there is a tradeoff between volatility and growth? Fortunately, there is no such a trade off. As many studies have documented (see Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, Manova, 2004 for a recent survey of the literature) the relationship between volatility and growth is negative, i.e. rapid growth is associated with lower volatility. This result holds, if one compares fast and slow growing countries, as well as periods of fast and slow growth/recessions in the same country. So policies to promote growth, if successful, are likely to reduce volatility as well, even though the mechanism of such spin-off is not well understood. Nevertheless, volatility of macro variables cannot be totally explained by their growth rates: even controlling for the average speed of change, there remain huge variations in volatility in various countries and periods.
Volatility of GDP is associated with external trade shocks. In the first approximation, volatility of GDP growth rates is caused by external trade shocks. As fig. 1 suggests, there is a positive correlation, albeit not a strong one, between volatility of trade/GDP ratio and volatility of GDP itself: countries with greater volatility of trade experience normally higher volatility of growth.
In turn, volatility of trade is greater in poorer countries and resource exporting countries:
Trade volatility = 27.6 -0.001*Ycap75 -0.25*Net Fuel Import, (Adjusted R2 = 25%, N=105, all coefficients significant at 1% level), Source: World Development Indicators.
It may be difficult for poor countries to respond to all negative trade shocks and to outflows of capital via changes in reserves, because these foreign exchange reserves are limited (Fanelli, 2005, p.17 The empirical evidence (Popov, Peresetsky, 2005) suggests that volatility of RER (coefficient of variation, i.e. standard deviation divided by the mean) was closely related to the volatility of reserves move in the direction opposite to changes in terms of trade), the volatility of GDP increases. To test the robustness, more cross-country regressions are presented in table 2. It turns out that countries that carried out reasonable macroeconomic policies (accumulated foreign exchange reserves in good times and spent them during "rainy days") were able to lower the volatility of GDP growth rates.
There is an additional complication, though. High correlation between changes in TT and FOREX is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for coping with terms of trade shocks in such a way they do not lead to greater volatility of GDP growth rates. Suppose a country responds to the positive TT shock by accumulating FOREX (i.e. carries out "good" policy), but this is not enough to prevent an appreciation of RER. Such a situation always occurs in countries with currency boards (dollarized economies as well): FOREX increase in response to improvement of TT, money supply expands, prices increase and RER appreciates. But similar mechanism can also operate under fixed exchange rate arrangements or dirty float, if there is no complete sterilization of changes in money supply, resulting from changes in FOREX caused by TT shocks. Hence, because any volatility in RER contributes to the volatility of GDP growth rates, it could be expected that when RER moves in line with FOREX (even though the correlation between TT and FOREX is high), volatility of GDP increases.
Changes in nominal rate occur quicker than price changes, hence RER can be more volatile under cleanly floating exchange rates as compared to currency boards. But if RER changes due to nominal rate adjustment, price ratios (between tradables and non-tradables) adjust instantly and the volatility of output may be lower than in case of the adjustment of RER due to fluctuations in money supply resulting from FOREX fluctuations and imposing pressure not only on prices, but on output as well. Since most countries with currencies of their own exercise dirty floats and carry out some degree of sterilization, this argument is consistent with the findings of Edwards and Magendzo (2003) : they find that dollarized economies and currency unions have higher volatility than countries with a currency of their own. Our argument, though, is a bit different: among countries with currencies of their own external shocks are best dampened (evened out, mitigated) when FOREX absorb completely TT shocks, and fluctuations of FOREX are completely sterilized, so that RER stays stable.
Cross-country regressions support the logical prediction: given the certain level of the correlation between TT and FOREX, the volatility of GDP growth rates is the higher in countries with low correlation between FOREX and RER and high volatility of RER (table 2) In fact, the these two correlation coefficients -that between TT and FOREX, and that between RER and FOREX -are closely correlated themselves (see chart below ) suggesting that most countries, when faced with a TT shock respond not only by adjusting their foreign exchange reserves, but also by changing the real exchange rate of their currency in the same direction. The point is that countries that completely absorbed TT shocks through changes in FOREX (so correlation between TT and FOREX was high) and prevented their RER from fluctuating together with TT and FOREX (so that the correlation between FOREX and RER was low) experienced less volatility than the others. On fig. 3 the extreme cases are that of Bangladesh, Burkina Faso and Ireland -these countries had high TT-FOREX correlation and low RER- (Robust estimates, N=59, R2=28, all coefficients significant at less than 6% level, except for coefficient of FOR_M2cor that is insignificant), where all notation are same as before.
It turns out that the volatility of RER is linked positively (although not significantly) to the correlation between FOREX and M2 (no sterilization indicator), positively and significantly to the correlation coefficient between FOREX and RER (suggesting that volatility of RER is higher, when, for instance, accumulation of FOREX cannot prevent the appreciation of RER), but it is linked negatively to the correlation coefficients between TT and FOREX (it is high, when changes in FOREX do not absorb fully the TT shock, so RER changes) and between TT and RER (suggesting, probably, that when RER changes without TT shocks, i e. due to domestic shocks, this correlation coefficient is low and volatility of RER is high).
Large government debt and external debt contribute to greater volatility. It appears that the response to a negative terms of trade shock via external debt accumulation, even if such an option is feasible (i.e. even if capital is not fleeing the country in bad times), helps to maintain the growth rate only temporarily, but increases the volatility of output in the longer term. Why capital is fleeing the country in times of the greatest need, i.e., when a country experiences an adverse trade shock? There may be several explanations that are tested below:
(1) large government debt prohibits the authorities from borrowing more money in the international capital markets, (2) large external debt prohibits the private agents from borrowing more money in the international capital markets in bad times, (3) herd behavior of international investors that pull the money out of the country experiencing negative trade shock: even though this country's government debt and external debt are low, the credit rating of a country deteriorates because of its reduced ability to earn foreign currency and service its debt.
The evidence below suggests that all three factors played a role. Government debt and external debt are strongly correlated ( fig. 4 ), but not necessarily because government debt is mostly to foreigners or because external debt consists largely of the government debt. The final result thus is the negative impact of all three factors on volatility of growth rates of GDP -worse investment climate (that worsens in times of adverse trade shocks and lowers the credit rating), larger external debt and government debt limit possibilities for external financing forcing countries in trouble to adjust to shocks via changes in RER and hence real restructuring.
Private capital flows contribute to greater volatility instead of mitigating it. It is shown in Fanelli, (2005, p. 19 ) that "a close relationship between the volatility of imports and exports exists in the case of both high-income and developing countries, although the volatility of imports tends to be higher than the volatility of exports in many countries, suggesting that the bulk of macroeconomic fluctuations fall on imports. This suggests that imports and exports are correlated and is consistent with the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980) according to which financial market imperfections are present all around the world and impede that countries generate large current account deficits…..These countries tend to induce severe cuts in domestic absorption -and therefore in imports -when they face a fall in export revenues (due, for example, to a fall in the terms of trade). The credit constraints in international credit markets make the bulk of the necessary adjustment fall on current absorption rather than allowing it to be distributed over time" (Fanelli, 2005, p. 19) .
It is also explicitly tested whether the inflows of capital ("fresh money" indicator equal to the difference between the reserve accumulation and the result of the trade account) contribute to consumption volatility (CONSvol) after controlling for GDP volatility and TT volatility: it turns out that all coefficients are significant and have the correct sign (Fanelli, 2005, p. 7 ). In 1992-96 RER increased more than twofold, then fell during the August 1998 currency crisis nearly by half, and then increased again nearly twofold in 1999-2005 (fig. 7) . Because volatility of output in all countries is closely correlated with the fluctuations of real exchange rate, no wonder Russian growth rates were very volatile. Unfortunately Russia did not manage to prevent sharp fluctuations in real exchange rate of the ruble, which disoriented producers and consumers and forced the economy to adjust to external shocks via real restructuring, which in turn caused greater volatility of output. No surprise, the highest volatility of output in Russia in recent 10 years was observed immediately after the 1998 currency crisis that led to the greatest devaluation of real exchange rate. It is generally agreed that the volatility of growth rates is a negative phenomenon. First, stable growth is better than the unstable, even if the average growth rates are the same. Second, it is well established that long term average growth rates are negatively correlated with volatility: the higher the volatility, the lower the long term growth rate.
In Russia, pretty much like in other resource oriented economies volatility of growth rates of GDP is strongly correlated with the volatility of RER ( fig. 8 ). However, there are some important inconsistencies with the international story, i.e. with conclusions that could be derived from cross-country comparisons.
First, volatility of GDP growth rates in Russia is linked to the volatility of external trade even stronger than in most other countries. Despite intuition, however, it is import, not export, volatility that is closely correlated with the volatility of GDP growth rates. Even more so, it is clearly visible on the chart below ( fig. 9 ) that changes in import volatility sometimes lags behind changes in real GDP volatility, so it is plausible to conclude that the volatility of imports is caused by the volatility of GDP and not vice versa. II  III  IV  1999 I  II  III  IV  2000 I  II  III  IV  2001 I  II  III  IV  2002 I  II  III  IV  2003 I  II  III  IV Up 70 % of Russian exports consists of fuel goods (gas, oil, oil products) with highly volatile prices, so it could have been hypothesized that the volatility of Russian growth is caused by the terms of trade shocks, i.e. changes in the world prices for oil and gas. However, volatility of exports and volatility of oil and gas prices are not closely related to the volatility of GDP growth rates ( fig. 10 ).
Fig. 10
Source: Computed from Goskomstat data. These results could be interpreted in line with the previous findings from cross-country regressions: given the terms of trade shocks, in particular, changes in oil prices (that are closely correlated with gas prices -another major item of Russian export), the volatility of the economy (GDP growth rates) is lower, the higher the correlation between TT and FOREX and the lower the volatility of RER. There is an important deviation, however, from the international story that was derived from cross-country regressions. As fig. 4 suggests, volatility of GDP is extremely closely correlated with the volatility of real exchange rate: it seems like periods of high volatility of Russian GDP growth were associated not so much with volatility of oil and gas prices, but rather originated due to direct government/central bank mismanagement -inability to keep the RER stable. Volatility of RER in time series regressions for Russia turns out to be by far the most important and the most statistically significant variable.
Second, high volatility of Russian GDP and RER is associated not so much with the volatility of oil prices, but with the absence of sterilization policy -high correlation between changes in money supply (M2/GDP ratio) and foreign exchange reserves (FOREX/GDP ratio). The higher the correlation coefficient between M and FOREX, the lower the volatility of RER and GDPthese indicators move obviously in opposite directions ( fig. 11) . Such a result -negative impact of sterilization on volatility of GDP -is directly the opposite from the result observed in the cross-country comparisons and it seems to be inconsistent with economic logic. As was argued earlier, the best exchange rate regime for mitigating volatility is the stable real exchange rate achieved via relatively stable nominal rate (crawling peg), absorption of TT shocks by the fluctuations of FOREX, and sterilization of changes in money supply caused by the FOREX fluctuations. To reiterate, in cross country regressions nosterilization policy (high correlation coefficient between FOREX and M2) turns out to be an important and significant factor of higher, not lower volatility of GDP growth rates, whereas in regressions on Russian time series it is exactly the opposite.
Sources of output volatility: external versus internal shocks
This puzzle is resolved by making the distinction between external and internal shocks. As was argued earlier ( Regressions on Russian time series data provide additional support for the existence of the described relationship. First, unlike in cross-country regressions, TTvol does not have any significant explanatory power for RERvol, even when included into the right hand side of the equation without any other variables. Although TTvol matters for explaining the GDP growth rates volatility, the significance of coefficient of RERvol is much higher. Second, unlike in cross-country regressions, the correlation coefficient between TT and RER is negative, not positive. And, third, unlike in cross-country regressions, FOR_Mcor, the correlation coefficient between M and FOREX, characterizing the absence of sterilization policies, enters into the right hand side with significant, but negative sign: These equations imply that volatility of RER is negatively, not positively as in cross-country regressions, linked to the non-sterilization indicator (correlation between changes in FOREX and M2) and to the correlation between RER and FOREX. As was argued above, this is consistent with the assumption that the volatility of RER in Russia was primarily caused by internal monetary shocks: expansion, for instance, of money supply happening without any apparent reason, led to the increase in prices and appreciation of RER (higher volatility of RER); whereas TT of trade did not change (so correlation between TT and RER was low) and FOREX were stable (so the correlation between money supply and FOREX was low), the volatility of GDP was on the rise due to RER appreciation.
Hence, it may be hypothesized that the main causes of volatility in Russia were not foreign, but domestic made, i.e. the volatility of growth resulted not so much from the volatility of terms of trade (even though TT volatility was high and Russia was very dependent on exports of oil and gas with highly volatile prices). It is one of the main conclusions of our paper: even in countries that export resources with highly volatile prices, like Russia, volatility of economic growth could be associated not so much with objective circumstances (TT shocks), but with poor macroeconomic policies -inability to keep the RER stable.
The additional evidence of poor macroeconomic policy in Russia is on fig. 12 below. First, Russia failed to respond to the TT fluctuations by altering FOREX -only in 3 quarters out of 28, for which correlation coefficients between TT and FOREX were computed for 16 quarters moving window, this correlation coefficients were higher than 50%. (N=27, R2=86%, DW = 2.08, all coefficient significant at 6% level or less, except TT volatility coefficient that is insignificant), where:
Mvol -standard deviation of M2 quarterly growth rates in 16 preceding quarters. To put it differently, the instability of RER is determined mostly by the instability of the money supply, not by the instability of the terms of trade.
Similarly, in a regression linking GDP growth rates volatility to TT volatility, RER volatility and M2 volatility, all three explanatory variables are highly statistically significant: GDPvol = -0.01 + 0.003TTvol + 0.07RERvol +0.27Mvol (N=28, R2=97, DW=1.7, all coefficients significant at less than 2% level).
That is to say, even controlling for the volatility of terms of trade and volatility of RER, volatility of output growth in 1994-2004 in Russia was dependent on the volatility of money supply caused by unstable monetary policy.
Conclusions and policy implications
In countries that export resources with highly unstable prices, like Russia, volatility of economic growth is associated with volatility of RER, which in turn is mostly caused by the inability to accumulate enough reserves in FOREX and SF. The option of attracting foreign capital in difficult times, when the country faces a negative trade shock, seems to be unavailable for resource based developing countries because private capital flows change pro-cyclically with terms of trade, thus reinforcing the trade shocks, whereas official capital flows, even though may be counter-cyclical, are not enough to compensate the destabilizing effect of private capital movements.
Russian experience in this respect constitutes no exception. First, as 5 charts below suggest ( fig.   13 ), private capital flows reinforce the destabilizing effects of trade shocks, whereas official capital flows and changes in foreign exchange reserves, even though mitigate trade shocks, are not enough to counter them completely. To investigate the issue more closely, all capital flows were grouped into three categories: (1) PCF -net private capital flows (including sizable "errors and omissions" in the balance of payments that are widely believed to be a euphemism for capital flight), minus sign indicates outflow of capital, (2) NPB -net borrowing by the public authorities, minus sign indicates the outflow of capital, and (3) It turns out that PCF move mostly in line with oil prices (terms of trade), although the correlation is weak, NGB is negatively (also weakly) correlated with oil prices, whereas increase in FOREX (dFOREX) exhibits pretty high positive correlation with oil prices. It means that only net government borrowing and change in reserves help to counter trade shocks, whereas private capital flows reinforce these shocks.
Second, the mitigating influence of official capital flows and changes in FOREX was not enough to counter all the terms of trade shocks, so real exchange rate fluctuated greatly in response to changes in terms of trade.
Third, the most surprising finding is that fluctuations of RER were caused not so much by the TT shocks, but by domestically generate monetary shocks -highly volatile monetary policy.
That is why in Russia, volatility of GDP growth rates in recent 10 years was associated not so much with objective circumstances (TT shocks), but with poor macroeconomic policiesunstable money supply that contributed to the volatility of RER more than external terms of trade shocks.
The policy implications thus are pretty obvious. The good macroeconomic policy for Russia would be (1) not to generate monetary shocks (2) to cope with inevitable external shocks via changes in FOREX and SF, while keeping the RER stable.
